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 ABSTRACT 
 
SELIN A. MALKOC: When should I have it? The Effect of Representation and   
Processing Concreteness on Consumer Impatience 
(Under the direction of Gal Zauberman and James R. Bettman) 
 
 Consumers frequently make decisions about when to consume a product and what 
costs to incur to obtain sooner consumption. Prior research has demonstrated that 
consumers show decreasing levels of impatience as the length of delay for consumption 
gets longer (i.e., present-biased preferences or hyperbolic discounting). In this 
dissertation, I explore the roots of decreasing consumer impatience and identify factors 
that lead to differential sensitivity to time horizon. In two essays, I show that the 
concreteness of mental representation and of processing are two possible mechanisms 
behind present-biased preferences. I hypothesize that present-biased preferences are 
observed when mental representations and processing are concrete, and that this effect is 
attenuated when consumers think more abstractly. 
 In essay 1, I examine the role of representational concreteness by making use of two 
temporal frames (delay and expedite) that differ in their associated degree of 
concreteness. I show that (1) defer and expedite frames are associated with different 
patterns of discounting, (2) the two frames are associated with differential levels of
 iii
  outcome concreteness, and (3) this variation in outcome concreteness can explain the 
difference in present bias.  
 In essay 2, I explore the role of processing concreteness (e.g., focusing on the big 
picture or on the details) in consumers’ present bias. I hypothesize and show that 
consumers who think more concretely will be more prone to hyperbolic-like discounting 
compared to those who think abstractly - even when processing concreteness is 
manipulated using an unrelated task. 
 Taken together, this dissertation provides a better understanding of the psychological 
mechanisms driving intertemporal preferences in general and present-biased preferences 
in specific. I examine the cognitive underpinnings of present-biased preferences and use 
temporal framing (Essay 1) and prior decisions (Essay 2) to establish concreteness of 
outcomes and processing as potential sources of decreasing impatience. The results 
reported in this dissertation extend the current theorization in intertemporal choice, 
temporal framing, mental construal, and sequential decisions. These findings suggest that 
conceptualizing concreteness at multiple levels helps explain not only hyperbolic 
discounting, but also adds to the understanding of several related consumer behavior 
phenomena. 
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 CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
On any given day, consumers make several consumption related decisions. Most of 
these decisions involve tradeoffs between different levels of attributes. Consumers 
consider exchanging higher prices for better quality, more convenience for increased fees, 
and sometimes more speedy consumption for heightened costs. This dissertation examines 
this last tradeoff, i.e., consumer decisions that involve costs and benefits that are 
distributed over time.  
 1
Consumers make decisions regarding the timing of their consumption on a regular 
basis. For instance, consumers evaluate and decide on investments and savings (costs 
incurred now for future gain), redemption of cash refunds and rebates (a wait period 
followed by earnings) and indulgent consumption (benefits experienced now but with a 
cost (e.g., to one’s health) incurred later). Another important instant of such tradeoffs 
involves delivery options for purchases. Here, consumers may need to decide between a 
fast more expensive delivery and a lengthier cheaper one. Such delivery cost tradeoffs 
have gained importance with the emergence of internet shopping. A recent poll indicated 
that in online purchase of consumer electronics, 35% of the consumers are concerned 
about shipping costs and some 23% of them are bothered by the delivery times (The Wall 
Street Journal 2002). 
 Given the pervasiveness of decisions regarding consumption timing and its related 
tradeoffs, it is important to explore how sensitive consumers are to the changes in 
consumption timing and the conditions under which differential sensitivity will be 
observed. One particular aspect of sensitivity to time horizon, impatience, is especially 
relevant to consumer decisions. Past research has shown that, when delaying outcomes, 
people are not only very impatient (use very high discount rates), but also show a 
declining pattern of average discounting as the length of delay gets longer – a pattern 
often referred to as present-biased preferences or hyperbolic discounting1 (e.g., Strotz, 
1955; Thaler, 1981). For example, Thaler (1981) found that to delay a $250 lottery prize 
for 3 months, people required an extra $50 (a discount rate of 73%). However, when 
delaying the same amount for 1 year, they required an extra $100, implying a much lower 
(34%) discount rate.  
Such displays of decreasing consumer impatience are important for several reasons. 
First, this pattern of behavior violates the normative assumptions implied by the 
discounted utility model (Samuelson 1937). Second, and more important, decreasing 
impatience leads to temporal inconsistencies. From a distance, consumers think that they 
will be patient (e.g., they believe that they will search multiple online retailers before 
making a purchase). However, when the time of action gets closer, tolerance for waiting 
declines and they behave impatiently (e.g., they once again select the retailer they visited 
on their previous purchase; see Zauberman 2003). Temporal inconsistency can lead to 
serious self control problems such as overspending and obesity, even when consumers 
                                                 
1 The terms “hyperbolic discounting,” “present bias,” “decreasing impatience,” and “sensitivity to time 
horizon” come from different literatures. These terms will be used interchangeably, as purely descriptive 
labels, throughout this dissertation. 
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 have the best intentions (see Lynch and Zauberman 2006 for a public policy analysis). In 
addition, studying the sources of present bias can potentially inform us about the 
underlying psychological mechanisms that govern intertemporal preferences in general. 
For all these reasons, this type of behavior – often referred to as hyperbolic discounting – 
has been intensively studied across disciplines. 
Although there is extant research documenting present-biased preferences, relatively 
little is known about its underlying psychological mechanism. It has been argued that 
impulsiveness and impatience are among the drivers of hyperbolic discounting (e.g., 
Rachlin and Raineri 1992). Indeed, most explanations of hyperbolic discounting have 
focused on visceral mechanisms (e.g., Loewenstein 1996). Some current research, 
however, has argued that cognitive processes might be sufficient to lead to such 
preferences (Rubinstein 2003; Zauberman and Lynch 2005). 
In this dissertation, I explore the roots of decreasing consumer impatience and 
identify factors that lead to differential sensitivity to time horizon. In two essays, I show 
that concreteness of mental representation and of processing are two possible mechanisms 
behind decreasing impatience. I hypothesize that decreasing impatience is observed when 
mental representations and processing are concrete and that this effect is attenuated 
when consumers think and represent events more abstractly.  
Taken together, the goal of this dissertation is to provide a better understanding of 
the psychological mechanisms driving intertemporal preferences. I examine the cognitive 
underpinnings of present-biased preferences and establish concreteness of outcomes 
(Essay 1) and processing (Essay 2) as potential sources of decreasing impatience. 
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 Furthermore, my research provides a better understanding of the implications of mental 
representation on processing.  
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Intertemporal Choice and Present-Biased Preferences 
Research on intertemporal choice has focused on understanding how people make 
decisions that involve tradeoffs of costs and benefits that occur over time. This research 
stream has used the normative discounted utility model (Samuelson 1937)2 as a 
benchmark, and has demonstrated multiple departures from the model’s assumptions (for 
reviews see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002; Read 2004).  
Of all reported intertemporal effects, perhaps the best documented empirical 
regularity is present-biased preferences, or hyperbolic discounting (Benzion Rapoprt and 
Yagil 1989; Strotz 1955; Thaler 1981). That is, when making a decision between smaller-
sooner and larger-later rewards, individuals’ implied rate of discounting (i.e., the 
premium placed on shifting an outcome over a given time period) is higher over a short 
compared to a long time horizon. This phenomenon has been demonstrated repeatedly in 
both humans and in lower animals (e.g., Ainslie and Herrnstein 1981) and has been 
modeled using hyperbolic (e.g., Ainslie 1975; Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Kirby 1997) and 
                                                 
2 The discounted utility model (Samuelson 1937) states that: 
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The utility, Ut(ct,… cT), over a given time horizon, t to T, is the weighted sum of instantaneous utility 
u(ct+k), over that period. The rate of discounting is determined by the weight, D(k), attached to utility at 
each time period. When the discount factor ρ is positive, utility will receive progressively less weight with 
time.  
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 quasi-hyperbolic functions3 (e.g., Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; 
Zauberman 2003). In hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic models, more weight is given to 
outcomes in the first period than in later periods, and this disproportionate weight is 
greater, the closer the first period is to the decision time.  
Yet despite extensive evidence for behavior consistent with present bias, the exact 
psychological mechanism behind it is still unclear. Most explanations of present-biased 
preferences have focused on visceral mechanisms (e.g., Loewenstein 1996), arguing that 
impulsiveness and impatience are the main drivers of this effect (e.g., Rachlin and 
Raineri 1992). This line of research has suggested that forgoing a current outcome is 
painful and leads to a feeling of deprivation (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991), resulting in 
impulsiveness and impatience that manifests itself in present-biased preferences (e.g., 
Rachlin and Raineri 1992).   
Some recent research, however, has argued that cognitive processes might be 
sufficient to lead to such preferences (Rubinstein 2003; Zauberman and Lynch 2005). A 
common idea in these cognitive perspectives is that timing of events leads to different 
mental representations of those events. Rubinstein (2003), for instance, has argued that 
the degree of similarity of outcomes at different points in time can explain several 
findings that have been previously interpreted as hyperbolic discounting. Consistent with 
                                                 
3 A quasi-hyperbolic discounting utility model (e.g., Laibson 1997) states that: 
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The key difference between this model and the standard discounted utility model (e.g., footnote 2) is the 
differential weight given to the first period consumption (ct) compared to all other consumption periods 
(ct+1,… cT), holding the discount factor ρ constant. As β gets smaller, the utility at the first period Ut(ct) 
gets greater weight compared to the utility in all other periods, Ut(ct+1,… cT). That is, as β gets smaller, 
present bias gets larger.  
 5
 this reasoning, in their recent slack theory Zauberman and Lynch (2005) showed that 
perceptions of relative slack of a given resource over time can account for different rates 
and patterns of discounting, including hyperbolic discounting. In this dissertation, I too 
argue that a cognitive mechanism – namely concreteness of mental representations and of 
processing – is one important driver of present-biased preferences.  
 
Concreteness – Abstractness  
The concreteness-abstractness continuum has been conceptualized in the literature in 
several ways. Most commonly, it has been defined as a characteristic of the stimulus 
(Brown 1958) and of the task (Osgood 1953). As a stimulus characteristic, concreteness 
refers to the degree to which an attribute directly represents an object or event (Brown 
1958; Paivio 1971). For instance, words that represent tangible objects (i.e., apple) are 
said to be more concrete compared to those representing general concepts (i.e., fruit). 
Similarly, it has been found that action verbs (i.e, run) are more concrete compared to 
adjectives (i.e., energetic) (Semin and Fiedler 1988). Concreteness of the words or 
attributes in return determines the concreteness of the mental representations that are 
evoked. Abstract words require elaboration and visualization to obtain a mental image, 
whereas concrete words lead to images easier and faster.  
Achieving abstraction requires the manipulation of spatially and temporally remote 
events. Either physically or psychologically distancing the object or event leads to more 
abstract representations of that event (Werner and Kaplan 1963). Proximal events and 
objects on the other hand, are more concrete and thus are dependent on the specific 
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 situation. However, the more abstract the task, the more it requires taking account of 
dimensions other than the current time and context (Paivio 1971).  
Regardless of how it is defined, the concreteness - abstractness continuum has been 
found to affect a variety of cognitive phenomena. For instance, concrete words are 
recognized quicker (Strain, Patterson and Seidenberg 1995), are better remembered 
(Paivio 1971) and lead to narrower categorization (Rosch 1975; Tversky and Hemenway 
1984), whereas abstraction increases comparability of otherwise non-comparable options 
(Johnson 1984). In addition, there has been some recent neuroscientific evidence 
suggesting that brain activation is different for concrete and abstract concepts (Binder, 
Westbury, McKiernan and Medler 2005), suggesting that both processing and 
representation might be different depending on concreteness level.  
This more general aspect of concreteness – processing – has not been directly discussed 
in the previous literature.  As mentioned before, most of the conceptualization and 
empirical evidence for concreteness – abstractness continuum concerned the mental 
representation of a specific task/word and its relation to the cognitions regarding this 
task/word. Thus, most of the work looked at specific representations and has not 
considered processing level effects of concreteness. 
In this dissertation, I propose that the effect of an initial mental representation can 
have lingering effects on subsequent tasks and affect how they are processed. In Essay 1, 
I concentrate on the effects of concrete/abstract initial representations on consumers’ 
intertemporal tradeoffs and on degree of present bias. In Essay 2, I conceptualize 
processing concreteness/abstractness as a mindset that is evoked in unrelated prior 
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 settings (i.e., not due to the characteristics of a given stimulus or task) and explore the 
role of previously engaged tasks on the extent of present bias. 
 
Concreteness-Abstractness and Present-Biased Preferences 
The notion of differences in the concreteness of mental representations stemming 
from differences in psychological distance has recently been introduced to the 
intertemporal literature by Trope and Liberman in their Construal Level Theory (Trope 
and Liberman, 2000, 2003). This influential theory posits that temporal distance affects 
preferences for future events by systematically changing the level of abstraction at which 
the events are represented. According to construal level theory, individuals represent 
distant future events in relatively more abstract terms, whereas they represent near 
future events more concretely. These differences in representations lead to changes in 
attribute weights over time (see also Soman, 1998).  
These findings suggest that temporal distance leads to systematic differences in the 
way information is processed, manifested in more abstract representation and thinking in 
the distant future. Drawing upon concepts from construal level theory, one can argue 
that because delaying consumption is a departure from the present, it anchors consumers 
on having the outcome in the near future and leads to concrete representations. The 
current scope of construal level theory, however, would not explain why and how the 
representation evoked would affect the consumers’ degree of impatience at different 
times. Extending construal level theory, I argue that evoking concrete initial mental 
representations of the consumption episode influences subsequent decision processes 
regarding the timing of events.  
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 I propose that the effect of an initial level of mental representation on subsequent 
processing can be understood as a type of blocking (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Miller, 
Barnet and Grahame 1995; Rescorla and Wagner 1972). Describing the situation in terms 
of a departure from the present leads to concrete representations and intensifies the focus 
on the present. This increased focus leads to present-biased preferences (i.e., hyperbolic 
discounting) when time horizon is incorporated into the decision. If this is true, however, 
increasing the abstractness of mental representations should attenuate the extent of 
present bias. In this dissertation, I propose two distinct ways in which such an effect can 
be observed: changes in the temporal framing of the task (delay versus expedite) and 
changes in the processing level.  
In essay 1, I examine the role of representational concreteness of an outcome in 
decreasing consumer impatience by making use of two temporal frames (delay and 
expedite) that differ in their associated degree of representation concreteness. I 
hypothesize that changing the temporal framing of a situation shifts the degree of 
concreteness associated with that task. This shift in representation in turn affects the 
pattern of discounting. Specifically, since delay scenarios describe the situation as a 
departure from the present, the focal outcome is more proximal and is represented 
concretely (Paivio 1971). This concreteness increases the focus on the here and now and 
leads people to overweight the present, manifested in present-biased preferences. 
Conversely, expedite scenarios depict the situation as a deviation from the future, 
decreasing the proximity and making the task and the outcome more abstract. In 
reacting to the abstract outcomes, consumers are less focused on the present and less 
constrained by the current situation, attenuating the degree of present bias. Supporting 
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 these assertions, in essay 1, I report results from five experiments and show that (1) defer 
and expedite frames are associated with different patterns of discounting, (2) the two 
frames are associated with differential levels of outcome concreteness, and (3) this 
variation in outcome concreteness can explain the difference in present bias.   
After establishing outcome concreteness as a moderator of decreasing consumer 
impatience, in the second essay I explore the role of more general processing concreteness. 
I propose that shifts in the abstractness of processing (focusing on the big picture or the 
details) also moderate the degree of present bias.  Specifically, I suggest that previously 
engaged tasks can alter consumers’ initial processing level and that the processing level 
evoked in an unrelated setting might have lingering effects on subsequent timing 
decisions. This hypothesis is based on the idea that present bias can be thought as a 
temporal context effect and that decontextualized thinking would attenuate such 
preferences. Specifically, consumers who are thinking more concretely have a mindset 
that is highly context dependent. Such a mindset would lead to processing that is more 
focused on the specifics of the decision context and would replicate the patterns of 
present-biased preferences. Consumers who are thinking more abstractly, on the other 
hand, can process the big picture in a decontextualized manner and thus be more 
consistent in their intertemporal preferences. Accordingly, in essay 2, I present results 
from three experiments testing this hypothesis.  
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 CHAPTER 2 – ESSAY 1:  
DEFERRING VERSUS EXPEDITING CONSUMPTION: THE EFFECT OF 
TEMPORAL FRAMING ON SENSITIVITY TO TIME HORIZON 
 
Although consumers face decisions regarding consumption timing regularly, not all 
timing decisions are the same. Consider, for example, two consumers, Alex and Sasha, 
who have just purchased a DVD online and need to decide which shipping option to 
select. Alex’s shipping is scheduled for the next day, but she has the option to delay her 
delivery for three days in return for reduced shipping cost. On the other hand, Sasha 
needs to decide between two, somewhat different, shipping options. Sasha’s shipping is 
scheduled for four days later, but he has the option to expedite his delivery to the next 
day for an additional shipping cost. Will these two intertemporal decisions result in 
similar preferences? More importantly, would the two decisions lead to different 
consumer reactions if the later delivery option was in 10 days compared to 3 days? 
The two scenarios above, although representing essentially the same timing/cost 
tradeoff, are framed differently. Alex is delaying the receipt of her DVD, while Sasha is 
expediting it. Loewenstein (1988) explored one of the implications of this framing 
difference and demonstrated that when delaying an outcome people require higher 
premiums than when expediting the same outcome (see also Benzion et al. 1989; Shelly 
1993). I suggest that temporal framing of an event has additional important implications 
for consumer intertemporal decisions beyond different overall rates of discounting. In 
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 particular, in this essay I make use of framing differences in order to establish outcome 
concreteness as a moderator of present-biased preferences.  
I propose that the temporal framing of a consumption decision - delay vs. expedite - 
will lead to differential sensitivity of preferences to the time horizon over which the 
decision takes place, manifested as different degrees of bias towards the present (i.e., 
differential hyperbolic discounting). Under delay frames, consumers will be more present-
biased and exhibit declining rates of discounting with longer time horizons, consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Thaler 1981).  However, under expedite frames, this pattern will 
be attenuated, and consumers will be less present-biased, manifested in less steeply 
declining levels of discounting with time. I explore this proposed interactive effect and 
use it to better understand the psychological drivers underlying intertemporal decisions. I 
argue that the mental representations associated with the two temporal perspectives – 
more concrete representations in delay than expedite – may explain why consumers will 
be more present-biased in delay than expedite decisions. 
In sum, I propose that demonstrating the differential sensitivity of consumers to time 
horizon under different frames is important to the study of consumer behavior. Extensive 
research in the intertemporal choice literature has consistently found present-biased 
preferences when delaying options over different time horizons. Establishing that 
expedite frames will systematically diminish this tendency would not only extend the 
implications of temporal framing (beyond higher discounting for delay vs. expedite), but 
will also shed light on the possible psychological mechanisms that are associated with 
hyperbolic discounting.  
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 ESSAY 1 – THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT  
Temporal Framing: Delay versus Expedite.  
First demonstrated by Loewenstein (1988), prior research has shown that people 
display higher discount rates when delaying a present outcome than when expediting a 
future outcome, keeping time horizon constant. For example, participants required $126 
to delay the receipt of a VCR for 1 year, but were only willing to pay $54 to expedite the 
receipt of the same VCR by the same length of time (Loewenstein 1988; Study 1). 
Loewenstein (1988) modeled this effect using a temporal reference point, in which 
consumption at different times is represented as a deviation (either a loss or a gain) from 
the current level of consumption (the reference point). That is, delaying consumption is a 
current loss and expediting it is a current gain. Since losses are discounted more than 
gains, Loewenstein hypothesized and found higher overall discounting in deferral than in 
expedite decisions, holding time horizon constant. This line of argument is consistent 
with work showing consumers’ perceptions of loss relative to a reference point (i.e., an 
endowment) affect which aspect of the situation they focus on (Carmon and Ariely 2000; 
Johnson, Haubl and Keinan 2004). When delaying an outcome, consumers see it as a loss 
and increase their focus on what they forgo, which is not the case when they expedite an 
outcome and perceive it as a gain.  
Extending Loewenstein’s (1988) findings, Shelley (1993) demonstrated that the loss-
gain difference assumed in the two temporal frames interacts with a loss-gain change in 
the outcome (e.g., a fine vs. a prize). Shelley’s findings show that delaying a reward is 
similar to expediting a penalty (present loss) and expediting a reward is similar to 
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 delaying a penalty (present gain). Such defer-expedite differences have been replicated 
under an identical elicitation procedure using a series of pair-wise choices (Loewenstein 
1988; Experiment 2), with real outcomes (Loewenstein 1988), and with sophisticated 
participants (Shelley 1993). However, neither Loewenstein (1988) nor Shelley (1993) 
explicitly discussed how reference point differences in the two frames might influence 
consumers’ patterns of discounting over different time horizons.  
 
Temporal Framing and Present-Biased Preferences 
In this essay, I focus on the implications of temporal framing (defer vs. expedite) for 
present-biased preferences. I propose that, consistent with prior research, consumers will 
show present bias when they delay outcomes, but that this tendency will diminish when 
they expedite outcomes. I argue that the two temporal frames anchor consumers on 
different consumption times. Delay frames anchor consumers on the present, leading to 
concrete representations of the consumption episode and resulting in present-biased 
preferences. Expedite scenarios, however, anchor consumers on the future, leading to 
more abstract representation of the outcome and attenuating present bias.  
 
Concreteness and the Interactive Effect of Temporal Framing and Present-Biased Preferences 
As discussed above, until now the effect of temporal framing – defer versus expedite – 
has been conceptualized in the literature in terms of a shift in reference points (e.g., 
Loewenstein 1988, Shelley 1993). But it is not obvious how a reference point shift would 
lead to differential present bias under the two temporal frames. I suggest that differences 
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 in concreteness of representations can help explain such an interactive effect. This 
perspective is motivated by recent research proposing a cognitive interpretation of 
intertemporal preferences in general (e.g., Trope and Liberman 2003; Zauberman and 
Lynch 2005) and present-biased preferences in particular (e.g., Rubinstein 2003; 
Zauberman and Lynch 2005). Common to these perspectives is that timing of events leads 
to different mental representations of those events.  
In particular, construal level theory (e.g., Trope and Liberman 2000, 2003) posits that 
temporal distance systematically changes the level of abstraction at which events are 
construed. According to construal level theory, people represent near future events in 
concrete terms, whereas they represent distant future events more abstractly. Such 
differences in representations lead to changes in attribute weights (Liberman and Trope 
1998; Soman 1998), as well as in decision processes (Malkoc, Zauberman and Ulu 2005; 
Förster, Friedman, and Liberman 2004). 
Drawing on concepts from construal level theory, I argue that initial representations 
under the two temporal frames are associated with different levels of concreteness. 
Specifically, I propose that delay frames, which describe the situation as a departure from 
the present, evoke concrete representations of the consumption episode. That is, 
consumers who think about delaying a current outcome represent this consumption 
experience vividly, with relatively detailed images and/or plans as to how the 
consumption experience will take place. On the other hand, expedite frames depict the 
situation as a departure from the future and evoke more abstract representations of the 
consumption experience, which are less vivid and involve less detail. 
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 These differences in the initial representations relate to other research looking at 
intertemporal tradeoffs. For instance Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) argued that concrete 
mental images increase approach motivation, leading to difficulties in letting go of an 
outcome and in delaying gratification. Such increased focus on the forgone has been 
found to be associated with higher levels of endowment and loss aversion (Carmon and 
Ariely 2000; Johnson et al. 2004), affecting consumers’ overall discount rates 
(Loewenstein 1988). As discussed earlier, Loewenstein’s (1988) reference point argument 
suggests that delay frames lead the situation to be coded as a loss, influencing the extent 
of discounting. These findings, although consistent with my prediction that temporal 
frames lead to differences in representational concreteness and affect overall discounting, 
are inadequate in explaining why and how the initial representations would affect 
subsequent incorporation of different time horizons into decisions. 
In examining the relationship between temporal framing and present bias, my 
conceptualization goes beyond the current scope of construal level theory. I am not 
simply interested in comparing decision processes for near (Xt) versus distant events 
(Xt+n). Rather, I consider the tradeoff between two temporally separated outcomes (Xt 
and Xt+n) as a function of the temporal framing. That is, I keep the two points in time 
constant and vary only whether people defer a near outcome (Xt ? Xt+n) or expedite a 
distant outcome (Xt ? Xt+n). I argue that the initial representation triggered under the 
two temporal frames influences subsequent decision processes regarding the timing of 
events.  
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 Such lingering effects of mental representation can be conceptualized as a form of 
“blocking,” an idea with a long history in psychology (e.g., Feldman and Lynch 1988; 
Miller et al. 1995; Rescorla and Wagner 1972). Relevant to my conceptualization, a 
blocking argument related to memory accessibility asserts that the activation of one set 
of associations interferes with the retrieval and activation of other associations (Feldman 
and Lynch 1988; Hoch 1984). That is, associations have different degrees of accessibility, 
and the initially most accessible association influences subsequent activation. For 
example, an accessibility argument, has been used to explain “anchoring-and-
adjustment” effects (Mussweiler and Strack 2001) by showing that an anchor facilitates 
the accessibility of confirming relevant information. Also, endowment with an option has 
been shown to influence which aspects of the situation are considered first, further 
impacting the relative accessibility of other aspects (Johnson et al. 2004). 
The type of blocking I propose refers to the effect of the initial mental representation 
on subsequent representations. Specifically, once an outcome is represented concretely 
(abstractly), it is difficult to activate a subsequent more abstract (concrete) 
representation of that outcome. I suggest that in delay frames, consumers first think 
about having the outcome in the present, which leads to concrete representations. These 
initial concrete representations block the activation of subsequent more abstract 
representations that would have been evoked when moving the consumption to a later 
point in time, leading to present-biased preferences. In expedite frames, however, 
consumers first think about having the outcome in the future, which leads to more 
abstract representations. These initial abstract representations block the subsequent 
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 concrete representations that would have been evoked when moving the consumption to 
the present. Since the representation is less concrete, present consumption is not as 
dominant, and present bias is diminished.  
H1: Discount rates implied in decisions will decline more with time (i.e., show greater 
present bias) in decisions to defer compared to decisions to expedite.  
 
Following this logic, any manipulation that makes mental representations under the 
two frames more similar should also moderate the hypothesized interactive effect of 
temporal framing and time horizon. One such manipulation is visualization. Prior 
research has shown that visualizing an event leads to more concrete representations of 
that event (Lowe 2004; Paivio 1971). Thus, visualizing future consumption in the 
expedite frame is predicted to increase the level of concreteness with which an outcome is 
initially represented, and therefore decrease the gap in representations under defer and 
expedite frames. Accordingly, more concrete representations should lead to pronounced 
present bias under both frames, eliminating the asymmetry stated in H1.  
H2:  Changes in the representations of the outcome will moderate the interaction of 
temporal frame and time horizon: the more similar the representation 
concreteness under the two frames, the smaller will be the difference in present 
bias. Specifically, visualization will increase concreteness and present bias under 
the expedite frame, reducing the difference in present bias between defer and 
expedite conditions.4
 
Next, I present results from four experiments. The first three experiments focus on 
the interactive effect between temporal framing and time horizon (H1) and 
                                                 
4 In terms of the quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility model (e.g., footnote 3), H1 indicates that β is smaller 
in defer than in expedite frames. I also theorize that greater concreteness will lead to increased present bias 
(and smaller β). H2 states that visualization leads to more equal β under delay and expedite frames, 
eliminating the difference in present bias. 
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 systematically explore the interaction using within and between-subjects designs and 
with monetary and non-monetary outcomes. To explicitly test the proposed 
psychological mechanism (H2), the fourth experiment introduces direct manipulation of 
concreteness using a visualization task. Since all four experiments followed a similar 
overall structure, in the following section I first provide an overview of the general 
empirical approach. 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The general task in all four experiments involves evaluating two options that are 
associated with different timing/value tradeoffs. Participants were presented with an 
outcome at a given point in time (either in the present or in the future) and were asked to 
indicate either the amount that they would give up (or give in addition to) in order to 
change the timing of the outcome (i.e., a matching task). In all studies, I manipulated 
two main factors: framing (delay vs. expedite) and the length of the prospective time 
horizon.  
The temporal framing manipulation had participants either delay a present outcome 
or expedite a future outcome, holding the time interval constant. In the delay frame I 
asked participants to consider an outcome which is available to them at the present and 
to state their preference for delaying it to a future point. Conversely, in the expedite 
frame participants were asked to consider an outcome which is available to them in the 
future and to state their preference for expediting it to the present. In all experiments, 
the defer task was associated with a willingness-to-accept elicitation method and the 
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 expedite task was associated with a willingness-to-pay elicitation method. Note that 
Loewenstein (1988; Experiment 2) shows that defer-expedite differences hold also under 
an identical elicitation procedure using a series of pair-wise choices. Thus, there is no 
reason to expect the current findings be affected by differences in the elicitation 
procedure.  
In all four experiments, time horizon was manipulated by varying the future outcome 
timing(s), but different time horizons (years, months, and days) were used in different 
experiments. In addition, in experiments 1A and 1B, I also manipulated the magnitude of 
the outcome in order to stay as close as possible to the original paradigm (Thaler 1981). 
In Experiment 3 I introduced a visualization manipulation to test the proposed 
concreteness mechanism. Lastly, the experiments use a variety of hypothetical 
consumption scenarios. But since both of the basic effects (delay/expedite asymmetry and 
hyperbolic discounting) have been documented using both hypothetical and real 
outcomes (see Frederick et al. 2002), there is no reason to expect that the pattern of the 
interaction will be any different with real outcomes. In line with prior research, I used 
continuously compounded discount rates (e.g., Thaler 1981)5 as the dependent variable in 
the analyses. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1A 
This experiment was designed to test the predicted interaction of temporal framing 
and time horizon (H1). I predict that deferral scenarios will lead to present-biased 
                                                 
5 The discount rates were calculated with the following formula: [ ] nXXr tnt )ln( += , where Xt is the 
amount at the initial period and n is the length of time expressed in terms of years. 
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 preferences (replicating prior findings), but that this tendency will be attenuated in 
expedite scenarios. To test H1 in the context of prior research, I used a modified task 
from Thaler (1981). 
 
Method 
 Participants and design. One hundred and forty nine undergraduate students 
participated in the experiment to fulfill a course requirement. The study followed a 2 
(framing: defer vs. expedite) x 3 (prize magnitude: $15, $250, $3000) x 3 (time horizon: 3 
months, 1 year, 3 years) mixed design. Framing and prize magnitude were manipulated 
between-subjects and time horizon was manipulated within-subjects.  
 Procedure. Participants were presented with a scenario, asking them to imagine 
winning a lottery worth $15, $250 or $3000. Participants in the defer condition were told 
that their lottery winning was to be received the same day, but they could delay its 
receipt to a future time. They were asked to indicate how much they would need to be 
paid in order to wait. Participants in the expedite condition were told that there was a 
hold on their lottery winnings and were asked to indicate how much they would be 
willing to pay to have their winnings that day, instead of waiting. Time horizon was 
manipulated within-subjects by varying the duration of the wait period to be 3 months, 1 
year, and 3 years. 
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 Results 
As described earlier, the dependent measure was continuously compounded discount 
rates; descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. I conducted a 2 (framing) x 3 (prize 
magnitude) x 3 (time horizon) mixed ANOVA, treating time horizon as a repeated factor 
(see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Replicating previous findings from the literature, I 
found a main effect for temporal framing (F(1, 143) = 53.84, p < .001); discount rates 
were higher for deferral (M = 0.79), compared to expedite decisions (M = 0.13). In 
addition, I also found a main effect for prize magnitude (F(2, 143) = 15.34, p < .001) and 
for time horizon (F(2, 286) = 58.07, p < .001), demonstrating a negative relationship of 
discount rates with both the prize magnitude (i.e., higher discount rates for smaller 
amounts) and the length of time horizon (i.e., higher discount rates for shorter time 
periods). These main effects are consistent with established findings, replicating the 
magnitude effect (Benzion et al. 1989; Loewenstein 1978; Thaler 1981), hyperbolic 
discounting (Benzion et al. 1989; Chapman 1996; Thaler 1981) and delay/speed up 
asymmetry (Loewenstein 1988; Shelley 1993). 
More important, however, the analysis shows the predicted two-way interaction 
between time horizon and temporal framing (F(2, 286) = 37.57, p < .001), demonstrating 
greater present bias in the deferral than in the expedite decisions (H1). As can be seen in 
Figure 1, I find that across all amounts, discount rates decline significantly more with 
time in the defer (M3m = 1.416, M1y = .631, M3y = .324) compared to the expedite 
condition (M3m = .190, M1y = .110, M3y = .075). Comparing the linear trend for each 
participant across the three time-horizon conditions, I find a significantly steeper trend in 
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 the delay (M = -0.55) than in the expedite condition (M = -0.057), t(147) = 5.70, p < .001. 
Manipulating time horizon at three levels allows for a test of further implications that 
follow from H1. Specifically, H1 implies that the rate of decline from 3 months to 1 year 
should be more pronounced in the delay than in the expedite condition, but this 
difference should be attenuated when considering the decline from 1 year to 3 years. To 
test this prediction I calculated two ratios (3 months/1 year; 1 year/3 years) and 
computed a 2 (ratio) x 2 (frame) ANOVA. I found a significant interaction (F(1, 134) = 
6.78, p = 0.01), indicating that ratio of discount rates from 3 months to 1 year was higher 
in the defer (Mdefer = 2.14) than the expedite frame (Mexpedite = 1.37), but that this 
difference was eliminated when comparing the ratio of 1 year to 3 years (Mdefer = 1.68 vs. 
Mexpedite = 1.63). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1B 
Experiment 1B was designed to test whether the results obtained in experiment 1A 
were an artifact of the experimental design, where time horizon was a within-subjects 
repeated factor. Although this is true for both conditions, this manipulation might have 
made the time horizon excessively salient to the participants. One might argue that if 
time is a dimension that is difficult to evaluate, it will have increased weight when 
compared jointly (Hsee et al. 1999). To conclusively rule out a saliency argument, 
Experiment 1B manipulated time horizon between subjects. I also used a different group 
of participants (MBA students).  
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 Method 
Participants were 2126 MBA students who completed the study during a 45-minute 
session to raise money for charity (they were paid $10 each). The study followed a 2 
(framing: defer vs. expedite) x 3 (prize magnitude: $15, $250, $3000) x 3 (time horizon: 3 
months, 1 year, 3 years) mixed design. Framing and time horizon were manipulated 
between-subjects, and prize magnitude was manipulated within-subjects. The 
experimental task and procedure was identical to Experiment 1A. 
 
Results  
I conducted a 2 (framing) x 3 (prize magnitude) x 3 (time) mixed ANOVA with prize 
magnitude as a repeated measure and the monthly premiums as the dependent variable. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Replicating experiment 1A, I found main 
effects for temporal framing (F(1, 205) = 47.69, p < .001), for prize magnitude (F(2, 410) 
= 36.25, p < .001), and for time horizon (F(2, 205) = 18.52, p < .001). More importantly, I 
also replicated the expected two-way interaction between time horizon and temporal 
framing (F(2, 205) = 19.04, p < .001), indicating a greater sensitivity of implied discount 
rates to time horizon when deferring (M3m = 1.410, M12m = .467, M36m = .228) than when 
expediting (M3m = .106, M12m = .174, M36m = .847).  
 
 
                                                 
6 One extreme observation in the $15 prize/3 months/defer cell was dropped from the analysis. This 
participant indicated a response of 3000 that was 74 standard deviations above the mean of his/her cell 
without that response.  
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 Discussion of Experiments 1A and 1B 
In experiments 1A and 1B, using monetary gains as outcomes, I show systematic 
differences in the pattern of discounting when the scenarios are framed as deferral 
(compared to expedite). These results, using both within and between subjects 
manipulations, replicate prior findings of hyperbolic discounting (Thaler 1981) in the 
deferral, but not in the expedite condition. Specifically, I find that the discount rates 
implied in participants’ responses are more present-biased (declining rate of discounting 
with time) when engaged in deferral decisions, but that this effect is significantly 
attenuated under decisions to expedite. The results of Experiments 1A and 1B support 
hypothesis 1, indicating that temporal framing of a decision context has implications in 
addition to higher discount rates for deferral (as compared to expedite) and affects the 
way in which consumers incorporate prospective time horizon into their decisions.  
Overall, these findings support my theory, indicating that delay frames, which are 
associated with concrete representations, lead to an emphasis on the present, resulting in 
present-biased preferences. Expedite scenarios, on the other hand, describe the situation 
as a departure from the future and evoke abstract representations, which decrease the 
emphasis on the present, attenuating the extent of present bias. 
To be able to relate the findings to previous literature, the first two studies used 
monetary gains to test the hypothesized interaction of temporal framing on the pattern 
of discounting (H1). However, many consumption decisions involve more hedonic 
outcomes. Experiment 2 tests whether my findings replicate when more hedonic non-
monetary outcomes are considered. 
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 EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 aims to extend the findings by demonstrating that the results obtained 
with monetary outcomes in Experiments 1A and 1B are not domain specific. To show 
that the interactive effect of temporal framing and time horizon is not unique to 
monetary payoffs, but also applies to general consumption utility, Experiment 2 
introduces concert tickets as the more hedonic and non-monetary outcome.  
 
Method 
 Participants and design. Ninety eight undergraduate students completed the study for 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The study followed a 2 (framing: defer vs. 
expedite) x 2 (time horizon: 3 months, 1 year) mixed design. Framing was manipulated 
between-subjects and time horizon was a within-subjects factor.  
Procedure. Participants were asked to consider having purchased an $80 concert ticket 
to watch their favorite band at a local arena. Temporal framing was manipulated 
between subjects by informing participants about an option to either defer or expedite 
the concert date. Participants in the defer condition were told that their original ticket 
was for the coming weekend, but due to unexpected demand, they now have the option to 
postpone going to the concert and receive a refund. They were asked to indicate how 
much of a refund they would want in order to wait to see the concert. In the expedite 
condition, participants were told that they originally bought a ticket for a future date 
and, due to a change in demand, now they have the option to attend the concert this 
weekend. They were asked to indicate the amount they would be willing to pay in order 
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 to not wait to see the concert. In both conditions, participants were informed that the 
only change would be the date of the concert, and the tickets would be for the same band, 
in the same arena, and the same seat. Time horizon was a within-participants factor (3 
months vs. 1 year).  
 
Results and Discussion 
As before, continuously compounded discount rates were used as the dependent 
measure. A 2 (framing) x 2 (time) mixed ANOVA replicated previous findings; see Figure 
2. The analysis showed a main effect for temporal framing (F(1, 96) = 48.42, p < .001), 
with higher discounting in the defer (M = 1.59) compared to the expedite condition (M = 
.74). In addition, I also found a main effect for time horizon (F(1, 96) = 163.00, p < .001), 
showing higher discount rates for 3 months (M = 1.68) compared to 1 year (M = .68). 
More importantly, I again obtained the predicted two-way interaction between time 
horizon and temporal framing (F(1, 96) = 47.16, p < .001), showing that the decline in 
discounting with time was more pronounced in delay decisions (M3m = 2.35, M1y = .84), 
compared to decisions to expedite (M3m = .96, M1y = .51). 
Another way to test H1 is to examine changes in the ratio of discounting in different 
time horizons under the two frames. H1 implies that the ratio of discount rates over short 
periods to longer periods would be higher when delaying than expediting outcomes. To 
test this prediction, I calculated a (3 months/1 year) discount rate ratio, and used a single 
factor ANOVA with temporal framing as a between-subjects factor and the ratio as the 
dependent variable. As expected, temporal framing had a significant effect (F (1, 93) = 
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 18.99, p < 0.01), showing that the 3 months/1 year ratio is higher in the delay (Mdefer = 
2.80) than the expedite scenario (Mexpedite = 1.96). 
The results from Experiment 2, which employed concert tickets as the focal outcome, 
replicated Experiment 1 findings, demonstrating that the results are not limited to 
monetary gains. Specifically, individuals showed preferences that imply a high discount 
rate for shorter periods, and this discounting sharply decreased with longer time periods 
(i.e., hyperbolic discounting). However, this effect was present only when participants 
were asked to consider delaying an outcome, but not when they were asked to expedite it.  
In sum, supporting hypothesis 1, the first three experiments conclusively demonstrate 
a very robust interaction between the temporal framing of the decision and the timing of 
the outcome. However, the proposed psychological mechanism behind this effect is still 
untested. As discussed earlier, I propose that the two decision frames are associated with 
different levels of concreteness in consumers’ mental representation, which then result in 
different patterns of discounting. The next experiment will test hypothesis 2 by directly 
manipulating concreteness using a visualization task.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
This experiment examines the potential psychological mechanism in more detail. 
Specifically, I explore the moderating effect of concreteness on the patterns of 
discounting by employing a visualization manipulation. I propose that the two frames 
are associated with different levels of representation concreteness, which result in 
different patterns of discounting. I expect that visualizing the consumption episode will 
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 increase the similarity of mental representations under the two frames. Thus, the patterns 
of discounting under delay and expedite scenarios will be more similar after visualization, 
when the levels of representations are more equal, than under a condition of no 
visualization.  
 
Method 
 Participants and design. Participants were 192 undergraduate students who completed 
the study as part of a one-hour experimental session. They were paid $10 for their 
participation. The study followed a 2 (visualization vs. control) x 2 (framing: defer vs. 
expedite) x 2 (time horizon: 3 days vs. 10 days) mixed design. Framing and visualization 
were manipulated between-subjects and time horizon was manipulated within-subjects.  
 Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine purchasing a DVD from amazon.com 
and to make decisions about the DVD’s delivery. Participants in the visualization 
condition (N = 96) were asked to write about receiving and watching this DVD with the 
following instructions: 
“Before proceeding, please visualize the moment that you actually receive your 
DVD in the mail. Describe in as much detail as possible the events that would 
follow the actual receipt of this DVD. Make sure to include details like: When would 
you open the package? Where would you store the DVD? How long would you wait 
until you actually watch it? Would you watch it over the weekend or during the 
week? Would you watch it alone or with friends? You can also include any other 
detail you think is relevant.” 
 
Participants assigned to the control condition (N = 96) did not see these instructions 
and proceeded directly to the main task. In the main task, I manipulated framing by 
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 varying the default delivery timing of the DVD. Participants in the defer condition were 
told that their delivery is scheduled for the same day and that they have the option to 
delay it in order to save money. Participants in the expedite condition were told that 
their delivery was scheduled for a future date and that they could have the DVD earlier if 
they were willing to pay more. Participants were asked to indicate the amount they 
would pay (save) to expedite (defer) the delivery of the DVD by 3 days and by 10 days. 
Lastly, as a manipulation check, I measured concreteness of representations using an 11-
point scale anchored at 1 (not concrete) and 11 (very concrete) by asking participants: 
“Next, please indicate how concrete your plans are for how and when you will watch this 
DVD.”  
 
Results  
 Manipulation check. The analysis of the manipulation check data had two objectives: 
(1) to demonstrate that delay frames naturally lead to more concrete representations than 
expedite frames, and (2) to demonstrate that the visualization manipulation eliminates 
such a difference. Therefore, two planned contrasts were computed. To establish that 
delay frames lead to more concrete representations than expedite frames, I computed a 
planned contrast using only the data from the control condition, where no visualization 
took place. As expected, representations were significantly more concrete in the defer (M 
= 5.58) than in the expedite frame (M = 4.45), t(94) = 2.09, p < .05). To show that the 
visualization manipulation eliminates differences in concreteness, I analyzed the data 
from the visualization condition. As expected, I find that after visualization, the 
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 difference in concreteness under the two frames is eliminated (Mdefer = 5.80 vs. Mexpedite = 
5.38; t(94) = .67, p = .50).  
 The Moderating Effects of Visualization. To test H2, I computed a 2 (visualization) x 2 
(framing) x 2 (time horizon) mixed design ANOVA with time horizon as a repeated factor 
and discount rates as the dependent measure. Supporting H2, results show a significant 
three-way interaction (F(1, 188) = 4.72, p < .05), indicating that visualization of the 
outcome moderated the interactive effect of temporal framing and time horizon (see 
Figure 3). I find that the control condition replicated my previous findings with a two-
way interaction of framing and time horizon (F(1, 94) = 7.58, p < .01), showing a greater 
present bias in the defer (M3d = 22.13, M10d = 11.64) compared to the expedite frame (M3d 
= 13.04, M10d = 6.94). However, in the visualization condition this two-way interaction 
was no longer significant (F(1, 94) < 1), with similar degrees of present bias in defer (M3d 
= 17.41, M10d = 9.45) and in expedite (M3 = 18.22, M10 = 8.69) frames. These results 
indicate that the visualization task increased the similarity of mental representations of 
the outcomes, attenuating the interactive effect of the framing and time horizon (actually 
eliminating it in this study). As before, I replicated the analysis by using the ratio of 
discount rates (3 days/10 days), with a marginally significant interaction of framing and 
time horizon, (F(1, 183) = 2.88, p = .09). 
 Internal analysis of the concreteness manipulation check. To provide further support for 
H2, I performed several internal analyses. The first analysis used a regression with the 
continuous measure of concreteness as an independent variable and the difference 
between discount rates at the two times as the dependent variable, indicating the degree 
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 of present bias. This analysis (N=192) showed a significant main effect for concreteness 
(std. β = .20, t = 2.81, p < .01), demonstrating greater present bias for higher levels of 
concreteness. These results replicated when only the participants in the control condition 
(N=96) were used, (std. β = .26, t = 2.55, p < .05).  
The second internal analysis was performed to directly test H2 and to further address 
a possible issue with the concreteness manipulation. Specifically, the visualization 
instructions explicitly referred to time, possibly increasing its saliency and causing the 
differences observed. To rule out this possibility as an alternative explanation, I created a 
variable, “concreteness similarity,” by grouping participants on their similarity of self 
reported concreteness on the manipulation check. For this analysis I used only the 96 
participants in the control (no visualization) condition7 (see Figure 4 for a graphical 
illustration). Two groups were created, dissimilar and similar concreteness. In the 
dissimilar group, I included those who reported above median concreteness for defer 
(highest on concreteness) and below median for expedite (lowest on concreteness). In the 
similar group, I included those who reported below median concreteness for defer and 
above median for expedite. Therefore, participants in the similar group should be 
relatively more equal in terms of their concreteness level between the two frames than 
those in the dissimilar group. Based on H2, I expect a greater difference in present bias 
between defer and expedite frames when concreteness is dissimilar than when it is similar.  
 
                                                 
7 Results also hold when data from the visualization condition are included, with a significant interaction of 
framing and similarity (F(1, 188) = 9.80, p = .002). 
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 This analysis supports this prediction. A 2 (similarity) x 2 (framing) x 3 (time horizon) 
mixed ANOVA, using discount rates as the dependent measure, showed a significant 
three-way interaction (F(1, 92) = 6.31, p < .02); see Figure 5. The results indicate that 
when participants have dissimilar levels of concreteness, the results replicate the 
moderating effect of temporal framing on the degree of present bias (F(1, 54) = 15.80, p < 
.01). However, when participants have more similar levels of concreteness, the 
moderating effect of temporal framing on present-bias is eliminated (F(1, 38) < 1).  
 
Discussion 
To test the moderating role of concreteness on the interaction between time horizon 
and framing (H2), Experiment 3 introduced a manipulation of mental representations 
using a visualization task. Across multiple analyses, I show that concreteness of mental 
representation of an outcome is one mechanism that drives this interactive effect. I found 
that delay frames trigger more concrete representations, leading to present bias, whereas 
expedite frames trigger relatively less concrete representations, attenuating this effect. I 
further demonstrated that the visualization manipulation increases concreteness and thus 
eliminates the different patterns of discounting between the two frames. These results 
demonstrate that if consumers have similar mental representations, the framing of the 
task (defer vs. expedite) no longer leads to differential impatience over time. In addition, 
this experiment employed even shorter time horizons (days) than previous experiments, 
further demonstrating the robustness of this effect.  
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 Note that in the delay condition, the visualization manipulation actually decreased 
the extent of present bias, which I did not expect. To understand the reason for this effect 
I examined participants’ written responses collected as part of the visualization 
manipulation. Examination of these written responses indicated that participants, in 
addition to describing the outcome in detail, also reported possible schedule conflicts for 
watching the DVD, as well as other feasibility-related issues. Thinking about the 
feasibility of the consumption episode might have affected their discount rates in a way 
consistent with my results (e.g., Liberman and Trope 1998). To address this issue directly, 
I conducted a simple post-test (N = 53), manipulating visualization in a way that focuses 
on the outcome and using only the delay frame. As expected, I found a significant two-
way interaction (F(1, 52) = 5.53, p < .05), indicating that the present bias was more 
pronounced in the outcome visualization (M3 = 25.48, M10 = 13.36; diff = 12.12) 
compared to the no visualization condition (M3 = 20.29, M10 = 12.83; diff = 7.46). Taken 
together, these results establish concreteness as an important moderator of present-biased 
preferences. 
 
ESSAY 1 – GENERAL DISCUSSION  
A better understanding of the psychological mechanisms driving intertemporal 
preferences is critical to the study of consumer behavior. In this essay, I examined the 
implications of temporal framing for consumers’ decisions involving different time 
horizons. I demonstrated that sensitivity of consumers’ discounting to different time 
horizons (i.e., degree of present bias) is significantly more pronounced in deferral decisions 
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 than in decisions to expedite. I also identified one psychological driver of this effect – 
concreteness of mental representations.  
The empirical work showed that the way in which intertemporal consumption 
decisions are framed has a systematic and robust effect on how consumers value changes 
in consumption timing. Four experiments demonstrated that when a decision is framed as 
a deferral, consumers display present-biased preferences, manifested in high discount 
rates that decline sharply with time. However, this pattern of discounting is significantly 
attenuated when the same decision is framed as a decision to expedite. I consistently 
found support for my predictions in different domains, using within-subjects and 
between-subjects designs, monetary and non-monetary outcomes, long and short 
prospective time horizons, and with undergraduate and MBA students.  
Experiment 3 provides direct evidence for a psychological mechanism by 
demonstrating that the concreteness of outcome representations moderates the 
interaction of temporal framing and time horizon. I show that the two frames are 
associated with different levels of concreteness. Deferral frames, describing a departure 
from current consumption, are associated with relatively more concrete representations 
and therefore result in present-biased preferences. On the other hand, expedite frames 
anchor expected consumption in the future, leading to relatively more abstract 
representations that do not induce the same degree of present bias. I show that when the 
concreteness of mental representations is similar between defer and expedite frames, there 
are similar levels of present bias in the two frames. In sum, four experiments support H1 
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 and H2 and provide evidence for a mechanism that can help explain temporal framing, 
sensitivity to time horizon, and their interaction. 
 
 
Theoretical Contribution 
Prior research on intertemporal choice has consistently demonstrated that scenarios 
that are framed as deferral lead to higher overall discount rates than expedite frames 
(e.g., Loewenstein 1988). I extend these findings by showing that the implications of 
temporal framing go beyond overall higher rates of discounting and affect the pattern of 
discounting over time. The results also indicate that the commonly reported phenomenon 
of hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Benzion et al. 1989; Thaler 1981) might seem so robust, at 
least partially, due to the deferral framing that has been employed in these studies. This 
could be very important to researchers who design and measure intertemporal tradeoffs. 
The results reported in this essay provide further evidence that cognitive factors, such 
as concreteness, moderate the rate and pattern of intertemporal discounting. As noted 
before, most existing accounts of hyperbolic discounting have focused on affective and 
visceral reactions (Ainslie 1975; Loewenstein 1996; Rachlin and Raineri 1992). Recent 
exceptions include a similarity-based account (Rubinstein 2003) and resource slack 
theory (Zauberman and Lynch 2005). This essay builds on and extends these more 
cognitive explanations by providing direct empirical evidence for concreteness as one of 
the psychological drivers behind present-biased preferences. My perspective is distinct in 
that it suggests that temporal frames are associated with different levels of outcome 
concreteness. I demonstrate that consumers with more concrete representations show 
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 more present bias, regardless of the contextual factors (i.e., framing). Taken together, 
these results suggest that a cognitive account – concreteness of representations – might 
help explain not only present-biased preferences (i.e., hyperbolic discounting),8 but also 
temporal reference point effects (i.e., delay/speed-up asymmetry). 
My theory and results also extend the current scope of the construal level theory 
(Trope and Liberman 2003). Until now, construal level theory has only examined the 
effects of differences in mental representations, but has not considered situations where 
multiple competing representations are activated. Thus, little is known about how the 
order of representations would effect the subsequent representations and resulting 
changes in preferences. To my knowledge, the current research is the first to demonstrate 
that the order in which the representations are evoked has an important effect, where the 
initial representation inhibits the activation of latter ones.  
Lastly, on a more speculative note, I suggest that to better understand present bias it 
might be important to consider the links between affective and cognitive systems. My 
proposed cognitive mechanism focuses on changes in levels of concreteness. However, I 
conjecture that an important link might exist between the level of representation and the 
extent of situational impulsivity. That is, I suggest that consumers might not be 
impulsive when thinking abstractly, and a more concrete representation might be 
necessary to have impulsiveness manifested.  
 
Implications and Conclusions 
                                                 
8 Note that I do not claim that cognitive processes can account for all prior findings results showing 
hyperbolic discounting. It is clearly a multiply determined phenomenon (see Zauberman and Lynch 2005). 
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 While the main goal of this essay is to advance current theory of intertemporal 
processes, the results reported also have more applied implications. My results suggest 
that it is important to understand the implications of temporal frames when presenting 
consumers with timing decisions. Specifically, when considering multiple time horizons, 
consumers who are anchored in the present would be more willing to spend relatively 
more money to avoid a shorter over longer delay in consuming a product, compared to 
those who speed up the consumption of a product. For example, consider the implications 
of this effect for shipment options provided by companies. As demonstrated in the 
Experiment 3, if the default option given to the customers is to have immediate delivery, 
they will not only pay more to avoid delaying receipt of their items, but will also 
disproportionately value shorter delays. That is, in such situations, a 4-day delay might 
not be twice as bad as a 2-day delay, but rather will be only slightly more aversive. 
Alternatively, if the default shipment option is scheduled for the future and consumers 
evaluate a decision frame as expedite, they will be more proportional in their valuation of 
different waiting periods and linear pricing might be more effective. 
It is also important for companies to understand the psychological effects the 
temporal framing of options has on consumers. Using delay frames might increase the 
willingness to incur costs to avoid very short delays, even when the companies would 
prefer the consumers to be patient. For instance, in the case of possible stock outs, 
companies often want consumers to not rush the orders and try to avoid dissatisfaction 
due to the delay. My results suggest that, under such circumstances, it might be more 
beneficial to use expedite frames in outlining delivery options. Current results further 
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 suggest that the different effects under the two temporal frames relate to the level of 
mental representation, which can be under the influence of firms, at least to some extent. 
For instance, by providing consumers with vivid pictures or concrete definitions of 
immediate benefits, companies can alter consumers’ level of impatience. 
In conclusion, this essay has demonstrated that temporal frames (defer vs. expedite) 
will lead to different degrees of bias towards the present. I show that the extent to which 
consumers are sensitive to the time horizon in a given consumption situation depends on 
the temporal framing of the task. I further show that the reason we observe this effect 
relates to the level of mental representation associated with each temporal frame.
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 CHAPTER 3 – ESSAY 2 
IT IS IN THE MINDSET! THE EFFECT OF PROCESSING CONCRETENESS 
ON CONSUMER IMPATIENCE 
 
On any given day, consumers make multiple decisions, often moving from context to 
context. Every situation has the potential to alter consumers’ decision making in later 
occasions, influencing their preferences. Recent research has examined how prior 
consumption decisions lead to differences in the activation of goals (Dhar and Simonson 
1999, Novemsky and Dhar 2005) and personality traits (Bargh 1997; Bargh and 
Chartland 1999; Khan and Dhar in-press), affecting subsequent behaviors, preferences 
and choices. I explore how prior tasks consumers engage in change their mindset (i.e., 
general processing level) and affect their consumption timing decisions. Specifically, I 
argue that while some contexts evoke concrete processing (focusing on the context), 
others facilitate abstract processing (focusing on the big picture), influencing consumers’ 
timing decisions.  
There are multiple ways in which a given situation can alter the level of processing, 
influencing consumers’ subsequent decisions during related or unrelated tasks. Possible 
changes might be triggered by the previous decision context and the options considered, 
or simply by incidental factors in the environment (e.g., the type of mental elaboration 
an ad or a news article facilitates, roughly simulated in Experiment 2).  For example, to 
illustrate the effect of a previous decision context (implemented in Experiment 1),
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  imagine a consumer who has set out to purchase a camera online. She has narrowed her 
choices down to two digital cameras, which vary on some of the attributes, but are 
otherwise similar. After comparing these attributes, she makes her decision and proceeds 
to ship her camera. How impatient would she be to receive this camera? Now imagine 
that the two cameras she was comparing are more dissimilar: atraditional and a digital 
camera, which would require more abstraction of the attribute level information. Would 
her impatience in receiving her camera be any different?  
The two scenarios above, although representing similar choice situations (a product 
evaluation, followed by its shipment), differ in the type of evaluation the consumer 
engages in. Whereas the former scenario (two digital cameras) prompts an attribute level 
comparison (evoking a concrete mindset), the latter (a digital and a traditional camera) 
prompts an alterative level comparison (evoking an abstract mindset). In this essay, I 
examine whether such shifts in processing abstractness – facilitated by a prior task – 
influence consumers’ intertemporal preferences in general and present-biased preferences 
in specific.  
Research on intertemporal choice has explored extensively how tradeoffs that are 
distributed over time are made and how a given situation affects such decisions (Essay 1; 
Loewenstein 1988; Loewenstein and Prelec 1992; Trope and Liberman 2003; Zauberman 
and Lynch 2005). One of the main findings in this literature was that consumers are not 
only highly impatient, but also show a decreasing pattern in their impatience as time 
horizon gets longer (i.e., Thaler 1981). However, this research, whether offering an 
affective or a cognitive explanation, has conceptualized intertemporal decisions 
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 independent of prior tasks and has focused on responses triggered by the focal outcome of 
the decision.  
Unlike the prior research, in this essay, I explore instead the role of the concreteness 
of general processing style – evoked by prior decisions – in determining temporal 
inconsistencies in consumers’ preferences. Given that consumers constantly engage in 
sequential decisions, I propose that prior decisions and tasks, that are non-focal to the 
current decision, can alter consumers’ processing level. I further suggest that processing 
style – more concrete versus more abstract – affects the way that consumers make 
intertemporal tradeoffs.  When consumers are in a concrete processing mode, they process 
information in a detailed and context dependent manner, leading to more present-biased 
preferences. When the processing mode is abstract, however, consumers process 
information in a decontextualized manner and see the big picture, leading to less present-
biased preferences. In addition, I argue that such effects can be observed, even when the 
prior decision is totally unrelated to the timing decision.  
In sum, examining the moderating role of general processing concreteness on declining 
consumer impatience (i.e., present bias) is important to the study of consumer behavior. 
All existing explanations of present-biased preferences focus on changes in representation 
of the focal outcome and do not consider the effect of prior decisions on general shifts in 
processing mode. Establishing that consumers’ timing decisions can be systematically 
influenced by previous tasks in which they have engaged would also add to current 
theorizing on sequential decisions, by showing that a prior task can change consumers’ 
processing focus, as well as their goals (Dhar and Simonson 1999; Novemsky and Dhar 
2005) and self perception (Khan and Dhar in-press). Furthermore, demonstrating the role 
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 of processing concreteness on present bias will extend the implications of mental 
representation theories (i.e., construal level theory; Trope and Liberman 2003), by 
establishing that representational changes can be associated with differences in processing 
and can have carryover effects to later decisions.  
 
ESSAY 2 – THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT  
Processing Concreteness  
Although concreteness of objects and mental representations has been a topic of 
interest to researchers for several decades (Johnson 1984; Paivio 1971; Rosch 1975; Strain 
et al. 1995; Trope and Liberman 2003; Tversky and Hemenway 1984), most of the 
research in this area has examined how the representation of a given event or an object 
affects cognitions related to that specific object. The main goal of this essay is to explore 
whether the concreteness or abstractness of how people process information in one task 
can affect subsequent, related or unrelated, decisions.  
Recent research has provided some initial evidence for effects of concreteness of 
processing level, showing that people who process information more abstractly are more 
likely to see the big picture and process information in a decontextualized, general and 
abstract manner. For example, thinking about the future shifts processing from concrete 
to abstract (e.g., Trope and Liberman 2003) and facilitates generation of creative 
solutions (Förster et. al. 2004) and broader categorization (Liberman, Sagristano and 
Trope 2002). In addition, Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu (2005) demonstrated that the 
prominence of directly comparable (i.e., alignable) attributes in multiattribute choice 
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 diminishes as time horizon lengthens, indicating a more abstract level of processing in the 
distant future.  
There has also been research exploring the relationship of abstraction with non-
temporal constructs. For instance, Semin, Higgins, Gil de Montes, Estourget and 
Valencia (2005, Experiment 1) showed that compared to people in a prevention focus, 
people who are in promotion focus use more abstraction in language. Fujita, Trope, 
Liberman and Levin-Sagi (in press) showed that people are primed to think abstractly 
perform better in a variety of self control tasks.  Finally, there has been some recent 
neuroscientific evidence suggesting that brain activation is different for concrete and 
abstract concepts (Binder et al. 2005). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
abstraction can operate at the processing level and affect a variety of phenomena. In this 
essay, I explore the carryover effects of processing concreteness on subsequent decisions.  
In support of this idea, processing orientation (global vs. local) during a task has been 
found to affect responses in several ensuing contexts. For instance, Förster and Higgins 
(2005) found that a more global processing style, manipulated through a perceptual letter 
identification task (i.e., Navon letters; Navon 1977), led to greater promotion regulatory 
focus, whereas a more local processing style led to greater prevention focus.  Macrea and 
Lewis (2002) demonstrated that changes in processing orientation systematically interfere 
with the recall of unrelated visual information. More specifically, they found that in tasks 
that require holistic processing (e.g., face recognition), interrupting the process with a 
local processing orientation manipulation (e.g., verbal descriptions) decreased the 
accuracy of later recognition. Supporting this point, Finger (2002) showed that 
manipulation of processing orientation with visual and perceptual tasks (i.e., mazes) or 
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 with instrumental music led to more general and broad thinking, increasing performance 
on subsequent tasks that require holistic processing (e.g., face recognition).  These 
findings suggest that performance on a later task can be moderated by an unrelated task 
that primes a matching or non-matching processing style. I focus on sequential decisions 
and examine the role of abstract versus concrete processing evoked in an earlier decision 
on the intertemporal preferences (i.e., present bias) elicited in a later task.  
 
Concreteness of Processing and Present-Biased Preferences 
As discussed above, prior research has mostly examined intertemporal decisions 
independent of the prior tasks the consumer might have engaged in. I suggest that a 
previous decision might alter consumers’ level of processing and that changes in 
processing concreteness might be sufficient to affect timing decisions in related, or even 
unrelated consumption settings. This conjecture is based on the results reported in Essay 
1, which indicates that present bias can be thought of a temporal context effect and that 
decontextual thinking attenuates such preferences. Specifically, in Essay 1, I showed that 
differences in framing of the decision context (delay vs. expedite) affect the extent of 
present bias, suggesting that present-biased preferences might, at least partially, be 
determined by the context in which the decision in presented. If it is the case that 
intertemporal inconsistencies are highly context dependent, then prior tasks that make 
consumers think in a decontextualized manner should decrease their propensity to rely on 
the decision context and increase their propensity to be consistent in their intertemporal 
preferences. Accordingly, I argue that inducing consumers to process using a more 
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 abstract and decontextualized mindset (compared to concrete and contextualized) would 
enable them to see the big picture and attenuate the extent of present bias. 
Establishing this proposed effect would have substantial implications for consumer 
research. Consumers constantly engage in different decisions with varying degrees of 
abstractness and specificity. For instance, during a purchase decision, consumers can 
either make very detailed comparisons at the attribute level or compare products on a 
more general level using alternative-level evaluations (Johnson 1984). Such differences in 
comparison level are related to the degree to which consumers think and act concretely 
versus abstractly (Johnson 1984; Malkoc et al.  2005). Similarly, in deciding whether to 
purchase a new product, a consumer might think about how to use this product or why to 
purchase it. It has been shown that thinking about the why (more abstract) versus the 
how (more concrete) of a situation systematically changes people’s processing focus 
(Fujita et al., in press). This perspective is distinct from previous research that has 
suggested differences in the representations of outcomes. Thus, I argue that a previously 
engaged decision or task might alter consumers’ level of processing and affect their 
subsequent timing decisions in related and unrelated consumption decisions.  In 
particular, I hypothesize that consumers in an abstract (as opposed to concrete) mindset 
will be less context dependent and take a broader perspective, leading to decreased 
present bias. 
It is, however, difficult to manipulate the general style of processing and provide 
conclusive evidence with one manipulation. Therefore, across three studies I use multiple 
manipulations to vary general processing concreteness versus abstractness. The general 
empirical approach is to first have participants engage in a task that is theoretically 
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 motivated and is hypothesized to change the level of processing concreteness, followed by 
a main task which involves making deferral decisions for different points in time. Next, I 
present results from these three experiments. Experiment 1 tests my hypothesis in a 
context where the prior decision is related to the timing decision. Experiments 2 and 3 
provide a stronger test for my hypothesis, by testing the effect of totally unrelated tasks.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The first experiment was designed to test whether abstraction in thinking, triggered 
during a related previous task, moderates the degree of present bias. I manipulated level 
of thinking by using a comparison task that presented options in a way that either made 
it easy to compare attribute levels or made it difficult to engage in attribute level 
comparison. Consumers rely more on non-aignable (difficult to compare) attributes in 
preference formation when they are in a more abstract mindset (manipulated by varying 
the length of the time horizon; Malkoc et. al. 2005). More importantly, Johnson (1984) 
showed that evaluating difficult to compare options facilitate abstraction in thinking. 
Accordingly, in this experiment, I manipulate the level of abstraction of processing by 
using alignable and non-alignable attributes to describe alternatives, and test its effect on 
consumers’ subsequent judgments regarding willingness to delay outcomes over several 
periods. I predict that participants who are in a more abstract mindset will have less 
present-biased preferences. 
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 Method 
 Participants and design. One hundred and two undergraduate students participated in 
this study. Participants were recruited in one of two ways. Some of the participants 
completed this study as a part of a 45-minute long experimental session and were paid 
$10 in return. Others were recruited on campus to complete the task and were provided 
with a chocolate bar as their compensation.  The data collection method did not interact 
with the variables of interest (all F < 1), so the data were collapsed on this variable. The 
study followed a 2 (alignability: alignable vs. non-alignable) x 2 (time horizon: 3 days vs. 
10 days) mixed design. Alignability was manipulated between-subjects and time horizon 
was manipulated within-subjects.  
 Procedure. The experiment had several parts. In the first part, participants were given 
a scenario asking them to imagine shopping online for a camera. They were provided with 
two options presented on seven attributes and were asked to compare and contrast these 
two cameras (see Appendix 1). In the alignable condition, participants compared two 
digital cameras with alignable differences. In the non-alignable condition, participants 
were asked to compare a digital camera with a traditional camera based on non-alignable 
differences. In both conditions, participants were asked to write their evaluations in as 
much detail as possible. Next, participants indicated their choice between these cameras. 
Lastly, they were asked to make a decision regarding the shipment of the camera they 
had chosen. Specifically, they were told that their delivery was scheduled for the same 
day and that they had the option to delay it in order to save money. They were asked 
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 how much they need to save in order to delay the receipt of the camera. Time horizon was 
manipulated within subjects by varying the delivery delay to be either 3 days or 10 days.  
 
Results   
 Present Bias. The dependent measure was daily premiums9, calculated by dividing the 
amount participants indicated would compensate for the delay in delivery by the number 
of days of delay. I conducted a 2 (alignability) x 2 (time) mixed ANOVA, treating time as 
a repeated factor. Replicating prior findings in the literature, time horizon had a 
significant main effect (F(1, 100) = 57.05, p < .001), indicating that participants’ per day 
willingness to pay to avoid a delay in delivery was higher for 3 days (M = 3.75) compared 
to 10 days (M = 2.47). Alignability did not produce a significant main effect (F(1, 100) = 
1.34, p = 0.25).  More important, however, the analysis showed the predicted two-way 
interaction between time horizon and alignability (F(1, 100) = 5.47, p < .05), 
demonstrating greater present bias in preferences when participants compared products 
with alignable attributes, compared to those who compared products on non-alignable 
attributes. Specifically, as can be seen in Figure 6, in the alignable condition, daily 
premiums show a greater decline over time (M3 = 4.24, M1o = 2.56; F(1,50) = 54.649 p < 
.001, η2 = .521) than in the non-alignable condition (M3 = 3.26, M1o = 2.38; F(1,50) = 
12.34, p < .001, η2 = .198). 
                                                 
9 Note that it is not possible to calculate discount rates in this experiment because the decision does not 
include an explicit base amount (i.e., the cost of the transaction in the absence of a delivery decision). To 
provide consistency, in this paper we report a simple measure of monthly premium across all three 
experiments. In Experiments 2 and 3, where compounded annual discount rates are possible to calculate, a 
similar pattern of results holds for this measure. 
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  Thought Listings. To explore the effect of the alignability manipulation on 
participants thinking, I analyzed their written evaluation responses. Open ended 
responses were coded by an independent rater blind to the hypotheses. Coding consisted 
of classifying and counting the attributes mentioned by the participants as “given” (the 
attributes that were used to describe the options) and as “new” (the attributes that were 
generated by the participants). Based on my proposed process, I expected the 
participants in the non-alignable condition to generate more new attributes than those in 
the alignable condition, but for all participants to mention similar levels of given 
attributes. A 2 (attribute type: given vs. new) by 2 (alignability: alignable vs. non-
alignable) mixed design ANOVA, with attribute type as a repeated factor, supported this 
prediction. As expected, I found an attribute type by alignability interaction (F(1,100) = 
16.22, p < .001). Specifically, while participants in both conditions mentioned a similar 
number of given attributes (MA = 4.22, MNA = 3.86; F (1, 100) = 1.07, p = .30), 
participants in the non-alignable condition mentioned more new attributes (M = 1.94) 
than those in the alignable condition (M = .25; F (1, 100) = 36.53, p < .001).  
To show more specifically that evaluating non-comparable products leads to 
relatively more abstract processing, a second independent rater classified the attributes 
mentioned as abstract or concrete. Concrete aspects of a product were defined as those 
that are directly associated with the object and represent the features a product possesses 
(e.g., Bettman and Sujan 1987). Similarly, abstract aspects were defined as attributes 
that are general, are inferred from concrete attributes and represent benefits that are 
provided by one or more attributes. I predicted that more abstract attributes would be 
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 mentioned by the participants in the non-alignable condition than those in the alignable 
condition. I expected no differences in the number of concrete attributes mentioned. A 2 
(attribute type: abstract vs. concrete) by 2 (alignability: alignable vs. non-alignable) 
mixed design ANOVA, with attribute type as a repeated factor, supported this 
prediction. As expected, I found an attribute type by alignability interaction (F(1,100) = 
13.56, p < .001). Specifically, while participants in both conditions mentioned a similar 
number of concrete attributes (MA = 4.00, MNA = 3.96; F (1, 100) = .01, p = .90), 
participants in the non-alignable condition mentioned more abstract attributes (M = 
1.96) than those in the alignable condition (M = .41; F (1, 100) = 50.04, p < .001).  
More directly looking at the role of abstraction in shifting evaluations, once we 
controlled for the generation of abstract attributes, the effect of the alignability 
manipulation on the extent of present bias was no longer significant (F (1, 99) = 1.82, p = 
.18. A mediation analyses (Baron and Kenny 1987) confirmed our conclusion (the Sobel 
test of mediation was significant; z (100) = 2.049; p < .05). These findings indicate that 
the alignability manipulation indeed influenced participants’ processing levels and that 
this change was responsible for the difference in present-biased preferences. 
 
Discussion  
The results of the first experiment are consistent with the claim that abstraction of 
thinking moderates the degree of present bias observed in consumers’ preferences. 
Specifically, Experiment 1 employed an alignability manipulation, systematically 
varying the abstraction necessary to compare the two products (Johnson 1984; Malkoc 
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 et. al. 2005), and showed that increased abstractness in thinking decreases the extent of 
present bias.  
The first experiment, although showing the predicted effect of thinking abstraction on 
time preferences, used a manipulation that varied the abstraction in a way related to the 
focal outcome. That is, participants indicated their preference for delaying the receipt of a 
camera, which was also used to manipulate abstraction in processing. To further test my 
hypothesis, it is important to show that this effect can be replicated with a manipulation 
that is completely unrelated to the outcome which is to be discounted over time. The next 
experiment addresses this issue.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The second experiment attempted to replicate the results of Experiment 1 using a 
processing concreteness manipulation unrelated to the main task. In the current 
experiment, I manipulated processing concreteness by asking participants to think about 
the implications of a (completely unrelated) policy issue either for a general group or for a 
specific individual. Prior research has shown that different information processing 
strategies are used in thinking about persons or groups; specifically, it has been argued 
that people employ more piecemeal processing in forming impressions of individuals but 
process information more holistically when thinking of and evaluating groups (Hamilton 
and Sherman 1996; Fiske and Neuberg 1990). Accordingly, I hypothesized that thinking 
about the broad implications of an issue for the general population would facilitate 
abstract level processing as compared to thinking about the implications of a policy for a 
 52
 specific and concrete person. As before, I predict that participants who are in a more 
abstract mindset will have less present-biased preferences. 
 
Method 
 Participants and design. One hundred and thirty seven undergraduate students 
participated in a one-hour long experimental session to fulfill a course requirement. This 
experiment was the first task presented to the participants in the session. The study 
followed a 2 (processing concreteness: abstract vs. specific) x 2 (time horizon: 4 weeks vs. 
10 weeks) mixed design. Processing concreteness was manipulated between subjects and 
time horizon was a within subjects factor. 
 Procedure. The experiment had three parts. In the first part, presented as an unrelated 
task, participants were asked to think about the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), passed to prevent music piracy over the internet. First I outlined the 
implications of this act on several constituencies (see Appendix 2 for the complete 
instructions). Participants were asked to think about the pros and cons of DMCA and its 
implications. In the abstract processing condition, participants were told to focus on how 
the general population of consumers would be affected by this act. In the concrete 
thinking condition, they were told to focus on a specific consumer, like their roommate, 
and think about how this specific person would be affected by this act. All participants 
were provided with extra space and were asked to write down their thoughts. Next, 
presented as a separate experiment, participants completed a cash refund study. They 
were told to imagine themselves purchasing a consumer electronic product that qualified 
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 for a $45 cash refund and were asked to make a decision regarding the time at which they 
would like to receive this cash refund. Specifically, participants were asked how much 
they would require to delay the receipt of this cash refund by 4 and 10 weeks. Finally, 
participants completed a written funnel debrief examining whether they detected any 
connection between the two tasks (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). No participant reported 
detecting such a relationship. 
  
Results and Discussion   
The dependent measure in this experiment was weekly premiums. I conducted a 2 
(processing concreteness) x 2 (time) mixed design ANOVA, treating time horizon as a 
repeated factor. Time horizon had a significant main effect (F(1, 135) = 14.67, p < .001), 
indicating that participants’ willingness to pay to avoid a delay in the receipt of the cash 
refund was higher for 4 weeks (M = 5.88) compared to 10 weeks (M = 4.24). Processing 
concreteness did not produce a significant main effect (F(1, 135) < 1).  More important, 
however, the analysis showed the predicted two-way interaction between time horizon 
and mindset abstractness (F(1, 135) = 5.33, p < .05), demonstrating less present bias 
when participants thought about the broad implications of this issue for a general 
population, compared to when they thought about its implications for a specific person. 
Specifically, as can be seen in Figure 7, in the concrete thinking condition, weekly 
premiums show a greater decline over time (M4 = 6.36, M10 = 4.07; F(1,70) = 17.42, p < 
.001, η2 = .199) than in the abstract thinking condition (M4 = 5.06, M1o = 4.42; F(1,65) = 
1.287, p > .1, η2 = .019). 
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 In sum, Experiment 2 manipulated processing concreteness using an unrelated task 
and replicated the results of Study 1 by demonstrating that mindset abstractness 
moderates the extent of present bias consumers show when making timing decisions. 
Specifically, when thinking about the implications of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act for a general population, participants’ impatience declined less with time, compared 
to those who thought about the implications of this act for a concrete consumer. 
Experiment 2 provides further support for my hypothesis, indicating that concreteness of 
processing affects the way consumers discount over time, even when the manipulation of 
mindset concreteness is achieved using a totally unrelated task.  
Study 2, although employing an unrelated task in manipulating mindset concreteness, 
might have confounded affective reactions with processing level effects. Specifically, one 
could argue that thinking about the consequences of this digital music policy on a very 
concrete person, like their roommate, might have put the participants in an emotionally 
hot state. That is, by making the focus of thinking more identifiable, this manipulation 
might have increased the vividness of the situation (Nisbett and Ross 1980) and led 
participants to be more emotional (Small and Loewenstein 2003). If this were the case, 
then changes in emotional arousal might account for my results. I address this issue in the 
next experiment by using an affect-free manipulation of processing concreteness.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3  
This last study manipulates general processing level using a priming task to rule out 
an affective explanation and further test the generalizability and robustness of my 
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 hypothesized effect. Specifically, I used a scrambled word search task to evoke concrete 
or abstract processing. Such priming tasks have been used extensively in psychology to 
prime constructs and goals (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar and Trtschel 2001; 
Sheeran, Webb and Gollwitzer 2005). The manipulation involved searching for concrete 
versus abstract words (Semin and Fiedler 1988; Paivio 1971) in a word search puzzle. I 
predicted that participants who are primed with abstract words will be in a more general 
processing mode and will show less present bias compared to those who are primed with 
concrete words and are in a more specific processing mode.  
 
Method 
 Participants and design. Two hundred and thirty one undergraduate students 
participated in a 30-min long experimental session and were paid $5 for their 
participation. This experiment was the first task presented to the participants in the 
session. The study followed a 2 (prime: abstract vs. concrete) x 2 (time horizon: 3 months 
vs. 1 year) mixed design. Priming was a between subjects factor and time horizon was 
manipulated within subjects.  
 Procedure. The experiment had three parts. In the first part, presented as an unrelated 
task, participants were presented with a word search puzzle. The prime words in both 
conditions related to fruits (see Appendix 2). In the concrete condition, I used the names 
of ten fruits (e.g., apricot, strawberry). In the abstract condition, participants were 
provided with abstract concepts representing the characteristics of fruits (e.g., juicy, 
healthy). Upon the completion of this puzzle, participants were provided with a gift 
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 certificates scenario, presented as a separate study. Participants were asked to imagine 
receiving a $75 gift certificate from www.amazon.com and were asked to make a decision 
regarding when they would use this gift certificate. Specifically, they were asked how 
much they would require to delay the redemption of this gift certificate by 3 months or 
by 1 year.  Finally, participants completed a written funnel debrief, and again no 
participant detected any connection between the priming task and the main task. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The dependent measure in this experiment was monthly premiums. I conducted a 2 
(priming) x 2 (time) mixed design ANOVA, treating time horizon as a repeated factor. 
Time horizon had a significant main effect (F(1, 229) = 45.03, p < .001), indicating that 
participants’ willingness to pay to avoid a delay in redemption of the gift certificate was 
higher for 3 months (M = 7.28) compared to 1 year (M = 5.23). Priming did not produce a 
significant main effect (F(1, 229) < 1).  More important, however, the analysis showed the 
predicted two-way interaction between time horizon and concreteness priming (F(1, 229) 
= 4.66, p < .05), demonstrating decreased levels of present bias when participants are 
primed with abstract concepts compared to concrete words. Specifically, as can be seen in 
Figure 8, in the concrete priming condition monthly premiums show a greater decline 
over time (M3 = 7.56, M12 = 4.79; F(1,107) = 26.49, p < .001, η2 = .198) than in the 
abstract priming condition (M3 = 7.035, M12 = 5.611; F(1,122) = 16.93, p < .001, η2 = 
.122). 
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 Experiment 3 used a supraliminal priming task to manipulate processing concreteness 
and replicated the previous findings. The results indicate that even when manipulated 
with a priming task, processing abstractness attenuates the extent of present bias. In 
particular, when participants were primed to think about concrete words, participants’ 
impatience declined steeply with time. However, when they were primed to think about 
abstract words, this effect was significantly attenuated. In sum, the results of 
Experiment 3 provide further evidence for our hypothesis. Processing concreteness, 
manipulated with an unrelated task below awareness, led to differences in the extent of 
present-bias, supporting the notion that processing concreteness is an important 
determinant of decreasing consumer impatience.  
 
ESSAY 2 – GENERAL DISCUSSION  
A better understanding of the psychological mechanisms driving intertemporal 
preferences and their implications is critical to the study of consumer behavior. In this 
essay, I examined the role of prior decisions that invoke processing concreteness on 
preferences over time. The empirical work provided initial evidence for the hypothesis 
that prior decisions and tasks facilitate different processing levels and these differences in 
processing carry over to systematically affect consumer impatience. Three experiments 
demonstrated that when abstract processing is evoked during a prior task (related or 
unrelated to the focal decision), consumers’ preferences show less present bias, compared 
to those who process more concretely. 
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 In this essay, I use a triangulation method to test my hypothesis. Prior research has 
not directly considered and manipulated concreteness of processing. Based on research on 
several literatures, I identify factors that would affect the level of abstraction in thinking 
and representation, and use these factors to manipulate the construct of interest. That is, 
all of the reported studies use novel manipulations that are distinct from each other. 
However, taken together, the results present a coherent picture and provide strong 
support for the moderating role of processing concreteness on consumers’ present-biased 
preferences. 
 
Theoretical Contribution 
Research on intertemporal choice has explored extensively how tradeoffs that are 
distributed over time are made and how a given situation affects such decisions (Essay 1; 
Loewenstein 1988; Loewenstein and Prelec 1992; Trope and Liberman 2003; Zauberman 
and Lynch 2005). The most established empirical finding in research on intertemporal 
choice is present-biased preferences – a decreasing level of impulsivity as time horizon 
gets longer. Research aimed at understanding the roots of such behaviors (i.e., Essay 1; 
Rachlin and Raineri 1992; Rubinstein 2003; Zauberman and Lynch 2005) has 
conceptualized intertemporal tradeoffs independent of prior decisions and focused on the 
responses evoked with respect to the outcome. This essay is the first to examine the 
effects of processing level on present-biased preferences by building on and extending 
research on concreteness-abstractness. This account is distinct from the previous 
explanations of present bias in that I propose and show that thinking of intertemporal 
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 decisions as one in a sequence of decisions provides new insights about the underpinning 
of intertemporal processes. Specifically, the abstractness of mindset consumers bring to 
evaluating timing decisions (rather than affect or cognition evoked during the decision) 
moderates the extent of present bias. 
This essay also builds on and extends the current state of theories of mental 
representation. Most discussions of this construct have focused on either the concreteness 
of objects (i.e., Brown 1958) or of the tasks (i.e., Osgood 1953). I propose and provide 
initial evidence for a different conceptualization of this continuum. Specifically, I argue 
that the concreteness of the mindset consumers have before reacting to situations is a 
critical aspect of abstractness/concreteness that has important effects on subsequent 
decision tasks in general and timing decisions in particular.  
In addition, the current research adds to the growing literature on sequential choices. 
Consumption decisions are affected by both prior choices (Dhar and Novemsky 2005; 
Dhar and Simonson 1999; Khan and Dhar, in press) and unrelated tasks (LeBoeuf and 
Shafir 2004), suggesting that consumers’ decision making can be systematically affected 
by actions in which they have previously engaged. Until now, this literature has focused 
on the effect of prior choices on consumers’ goals and self perception. I concentrated on 
the different levels of processing  evoked by prior tasks and showed that such processing 
differences can have lingering effects on consumers’ timing decisions in both related 
(Experiment 1) or unrelated consumption situations (Experiment 2 and 3).  
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 Implications and Conclusions 
While the main goal of this essay is to advance current theory of intertemporal 
processes, my results also have more applied implications. The results suggest that how 
consumers make timing decisions is systematically affected by the tasks they have 
previously engaged in. The empirical work demonstrate that there are several ways in 
which consumers’ processing concreteness can be affected, and each of these ways has a 
systematically impact on the degree of impatience consumers have when considering 
timing options. 
This has important marketing implications.  For example, online retailers have some 
control over the sequence of tasks consumers face.  Providing consumers with more 
similar products to examine in a recommended set of options will enhance comparability 
and lead to more concrete processing (experiment 1).  More concrete processing during 
choice then may result in enhanced willingness to pay to avoid delayed delivery (even for 
short periods).  However, providing consumers with less comparable products might 
encourage more abstract processing and decrease this tendency to avoid delivery delay.  
Retailers might benefit from understanding such effects, because having impatient 
consumers who are willing to incur additional costs for speedy consumption is not always 
desirable for the companies (e.g., when current stock is limited). Without recognizing it, 
retailers might be influencing such timing decisions with the options they provide for 
comparison; accordingly, retailers should take the possible effects of consumer interfaces 
on intertemporal tradeoffs into account.  
 61
 In conclusion, this essay has demonstrated that differences in levels of consumers’ 
processing concreteness have systematic effects on timing decisions. That is, the extent to 
which consumers are sensitive to the time horizon in a given consumption situation 
depends on the abstractness of their mindset, which can be influenced by prior 
experiences.
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 CHAPTER 4 – GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
A better understanding of the psychological mechanisms driving intertemporal 
preferences and their implications is critical to the study of consumer behavior. In this 
dissertation, I examine cognitive underpinnings of intertemporal decisions in general and 
present-biased preferences in specific. In two essays, I show that concreteness of 
representations and processing are important drivers of decisions that involve tradeoffs 
distributed over time.  
In essay 1, I examine the role of representational concreteness in decreasing consumer 
impatience by making use of two temporal frames (delay and expedite) that differ in their 
associated degree of representation concreteness. Specifically, I show that defer and 
expedite frames are associated with differential levels of outcome concreteness and that 
these differences in concreteness lead to different patterns of discounting over time. I find 
that a commonly reported intertemporal anomaly, present bias, is significantly 
attenuated in expedite frames. 
In essay 2, I explore the role of processing concreteness in general. I propose that 
shifts in the abstractness of processing (focusing on the big picture or the details) would 
also moderate the degree of present bias.  Specifically, consumers who are thinking more 
concretely would be more prone to hyperbolic-like discounting compared to those who are 
thinking abstractly. More importantly, such a pattern of results might be obtained even
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 when information processing concreteness is manipulated with an unrelated task. Three 
experiments, which employ different and novel manipulations of processing concreteness, 
consistently support this prediction.  
This dissertation contributes to existing theory in several ways. First, in Essay 1, I 
extend the implications of different temporal frames from overall discount rates to 
patterns of discounting over time. Specifically, the results of my experiments show that 
framing a decision as delay versus expedite systematically affects people’s sensitivity to 
changes in time horizon. To my knowledge, the current research is the first to explore the 
effects of temporal framing on discounting future outcomes over different time horizons.  
The current results also indicate that the commonly reported phenomenon of 
hyperbolic discounting (Benzion et al. 1989; Thaler 1981) might seem so robust, at least 
partially, due to the deferral framing that has been employed in these studies. These 
results also provide further evidence that cognitive factors, such as concreteness, 
moderate the rate and pattern of discounting. This finding has important implications for 
researchers of intertemporal choice, who measure preferences over time.  
Furthermore, results reported in Essay 2 suggest that these cognitive effects can be 
obtained whenever concreteness of processing is manipulated, with prior related or 
unrelated tasks. The conceptualization and empirical findings in Essay 2 are the first in 
the literature to indicate that intertemporal decisions can be affected by the processing 
style used in prior decisions.  
This dissertation also extends the current scope of research on concreteness in general 
(e.g., Pavio 1971) and construal level theory in particular (Trope and Liberman 2003). 
Most existing discussions of this construct have focused on either the concreteness of 
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objects (i.e., Brown 1958) or of the tasks (i.e., Osgood 1953). In this dissertation I provide 
evidence for a different conceptualization of this continuum. Specifically, I demonstrate 
that the mindset consumers bring to a decision setting has systematic effects on latter 
decisions. I demonstrate one class of such effects for timing decisions.  
In addition, this dissertation examines situations where multiple competing 
representations are activated. Until now, research on mental represenatations (e.g., Trope 
and Liberman 2003) has only examined the effects of differences in mental 
representations. Thus, little is known about how the order of representations effects 
subsequent representations and resulting changes in preferences. This dissertation is the 
first to demonstrate that the order in which the representations are evoked has an 
important effect, where the initial representation inhibits the activation of latter ones.  
Lastly, this dissertation extends the growing literature on sequential choices. Recent 
research has demonstrated that consumption decisions are affected by both prior choices 
(Dhar and Novemsky 2005; Dhar and Simonson 1999; Khan and Dhar, in press) and 
unrelated tasks (LeBoeuf and Shafir 2004), suggesting that consumers’ decision making 
can be systematically affected by actions in which they have previously engaged. Until 
now, this literature has focused on the effect of prior choices on consumers’ goals and self 
perception. In Essay 2, I concentrated on the different levels of processing evoked by 
prior tasks and showed that such processing differences can have lingering effects on 
consumers’ timing decisions in both related or unrelated consumption situations.  
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    3 months 1 year 3 years 
    $15  $250  $3,000  $15  $250  $3,000  $15  $250  $3,000  
2.500         1.142 0.522 1.008 0.568 0.292 0.450 0.322 0.197
Defer (2.046)         (1.199) (0.733) (0.788) (0.510) (0.331) (0.342) (0.267) (0.162)
0.394         0.118 0.065 0.195 0.084 0.055 0.129 0.058 0.041
Experiment 
1 
Expedite (0.600)         (0.204) (0.057) (0.205) (0.070) (0.047) (0.143) (0.039) (0.041)
2.029         1.222 0.980 0.759 0.363 0.279 0.303 0.198 0.184
Defer (1.841)        (1.366) (1.232) (0.908) (0.367) (0.335) (0.209) (0.135) (0.168) 
0.167         0.090 0.062 0.251 0.159 0.112 0.112 0.082 0.060
Experiment 
1A 
Expedite (0.388)         (0.106) (0.081) (0.553) (0.429) (0.397) (0.172) (0.090) (0.065)
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Table 1  
Essay 1 – Means and (Standard Deviations) of discount rates in Experiment 1A and 1B. 
 
Note. In Experiment 1A amounts were manipulated between participants and time horizon within participants, while in 
Experiment 1B amounts were manipulated within participants and time horizon between participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1  
Essay 1 – Experiment 1A results, showing the time horizon by temporal frame 
interaction. 
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Figure 2  
Essay 1 – Experiment 2 results, showing the time horizon by temporal frame interaction. 
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 Figure 3 
Essay 1 - Experiment 3 results, showing the time horizon by temporal frame interaction 
for the control and visualization conditions.  
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 Figure 4 
Essay 1 – Graphical illustration of the method for creating the similarity conditions using 
the concreteness measure. The figure illustrates the similar and dissimilar regions of 
concreteness in the defer and expedite frames.  
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 Figure 5 
Essay 1 – Experiment 3 results, showing the time horizon by temporal frame interaction 
for similar and dissimilar mental representations. 
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 Figure 6 
Essay 1 –Experiment 1 results, showing the time horizon by alignability interaction. 
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 Figure 7 
Essay 2 – Experiment 2 results, showing the time horizon by thinking abstractness 
interaction. 
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 Figure 8 
Essay 2 – Experiment 3 results, showing the time horizon by abstractness priming 
interaction. 
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 APPENDIX 1 
Essay 2 – Stimuli used in Experiment 1  
 
ALIGNABLE CONDITION 
 
DIGITAL CAMERA   TRADITIONAL CAMERA  
Camera Size Compact  Camera Size Compact 
Battery Life 4 hours  Battery Life 6 hours 
Resolution 3 megapixel  Resolution 4 megapixel 
Optical Zoom 3x  Optical Zoom 2x 
Digital Zoom 2x  Digital Zoom 3x 
Interchangeable Lens None  Interchangeable Lens None 
Print Quality Medium  Print Quality Medium 
 
NON-ALIGNABLE CONDITION 
DIGITAL CAMERA   TRADITIONAL CAMERA  
Camera Size Compact  Focus Auto, Manual  
Battery Life 4 hours  Shutter Speed 2 frames /second 
Resolution 3 megapixel  Flash Integrated 
Optical Zoom 3x  Power Source 2 AA batteries 
Digital Zoom 2x  Resolution 4000x6000 
Interchangeable Lens None  Screen  LCD 
Print Quality Medium  Picture Preview None 
 
 
 
 75
 APPENDIX 2 
Essay 2 – Stimuli used in Experiment 2  
 
Concrete Thinking Condition 
 
In this short study we are interested in the opinions of UNC undergraduate students 
about the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). DMCA was passed to prevent 
music piracy over the Internet. Music piracy is the unauthorized duplication of an 
original recording without the consent of the rights owner, which is becoming 
increasingly frequent with the growth of the internet. 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act effects several parties and has implications for 
numerous issues. For instance, DMCA has an impact on the artists who create the record, 
the recording companies who produce the record and the consumers who purchase and 
enjoy the record. A wide variety of issues are influenced by this act. These issues include, 
but are not limited to the rights of the artists, the wellbeing of the music industry and 
general economy, as well as the welfare of consumers. 
 
We ask that you think about a specific case relating to digital music piracy and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Next, please think about the pros and cons of the 
DMCA and its implications for a specific consumer. In doing so, please focus on how an 
individual consumer of music, like your roommate, is affected by this act.  
 
 
Abstract Thinking Condition 
 
In this short study we are interested in the opinions of UNC undergraduate students 
about the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). DMCA was passed to prevent 
music piracy over the Internet. Music piracy is the unauthorized duplication of an 
original recording without the consent of the rights owner, which is becoming 
increasingly frequent with the growth of the internet. 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act effects several parties and has implications for 
numerous issues. For instance, DMCA has an impact on the artists who create the record, 
the recording companies who produce the record and the consumers who purchase and 
enjoy the record. A wide variety of issues are influenced by this act. These issues include, 
but are not limited to the rights of the artists, the wellbeing of the music industry and 
general economy, as well as the welfare of consumers. 
 
We ask that you think about a specific case relating to digital music piracy and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Next, please think about the pros and cons of the 
DMCA and its implications for consumers in general. In doing so, please focus on how the 
general population of consumers is affected by this act.  
 76
 APPENDIX 3 
Essay 2 – Stimuli used in Experiment 3  
 
 
Concrete Priming Condition 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract Priming Condition 
 
 
 
M Y R R N P D P Z G 
U R C A E J P I A R 
L R V R E G F N N A 
P E O E Y P R E A P 
S B E R R M D A N E 
L W T O C I R P A S 
M A V T I K X P B W 
N R H C A E P L F N 
F T H S A L D E O C 
O S C H E R R Y U E 
F Y Z D T V I K N J 
 R E F R E S H I N G 
E H K V E P M P L W 
S J Q A M A I T A A 
H R S N T Q H R R R 
S U O I T I R T U N 
G T V T F R U I T Y 
Y H T L A E H V A F 
Y C I U J K E S N M 
C X K Z Z I W U V Y 
Fruity 
Vitamin 
Healthy 
Natural 
Juicy 
Fresh 
Raw 
Nutritious 
Ripe 
Refreshing 
 
Apple 
Pear 
Banana 
Cherry 
Plum 
Pineapple 
Strawberry 
Grapes 
Apricot 
Peach 
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